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“VEILED” THREATS OF LIABILITY: EXPLORING
WHETHER PATENT LAW ACTUALLY SETS A DIFFERENT
STANDARD FOR “PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL”
Piercing the corporate veil is one of the most difficult undertakings for
litigators. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that piercing the
corporate veil is one of the most litigated issues in corporate law. 1 Yet,
according to some recent publications, the Federal Circuit made piercing the
corporate veil even more difficult to grasp when it deviated from traditional
standards in dealing with corporate officers accused of patent infringement. 2
Many people in the patent litigation practice believe that the Federal Circuit is
now willing to hold corporate officers personally liable for patent infringement,
despite the fact that piercing the corporate veil is used for shareholder
liability. 3 Lynda Oswald and Steven Seidenberg lead this train of thought. 4
While their conclusion illustrates a growing consensus regarding the Federal
Circuit’s recent decision, the conclusion is misguided. In reality, the Federal
Circuit’s decisions in patent infringement cases do not deviate from traditional
corporate law rules regarding piercing the corporate veil.
Proponents of the idea that the Federal Circuit has created a new standard
neglect to consider the full context of the cases they criticize. For example,
proponents generally point to Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.
as the origin of this supposed new standard applied to patent infringement
cases. 5 In Orthokinetics, the court had to decide whether to hold three
stockholders and officers personally liable for their companies’ patent
infringement. 6 Reversing the district court’s dismissal of a jury verdict, the
Orthokinetics judges held the stockholders and officers “personally liable for
acts of direct infringement and for inducing infringement.” 7 Oswald takes issue
1

Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036

(1991).
2 See generally Lynda J. Oswald, The Divergence of Corporate Officer Liability Doctrine Under Patent
and Copyright Law, 52 Am. Bus. L.J. 557 (2015); Steven Seidenberg, Decision Could Make it Difficult to
Hold Executives Liable for Inducing Infringement, Inside Counsel (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.
com/2013/03/26/decision-could-make-it-difficult-to-hold-executive?&slreturn=1474129082.
3 SPERO: ASSET PROTECTION ¶ 11.03 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, (2001), Westlaw 1585220.
4 See Oswald, supra; Seidenberg, supra. Lynda Oswald explores this issue in an article for the American
Business Law Journal. Steven Seidenberg similarly discusses the issue in an article for Inside Councel.
5 See generally Oswald, supra note 3 at 576; Seidenberg, supra note 4.
6 Orthokinetics v. Safety Travel Chairs, 806 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
7 Id. at 1578

FIALKOW GALLEYSPROOFS

1002

12/14/2016 1:43 PM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW

[Vol. 4

with the Orthokinetics court’s assertion that, “evaluating the personal liability
of officers ‘requires invocation of those general principles relating to piercing
the corporate veil.’” 8 On the surface, this proclamation seems strange because
officers are typically not held liable through piercing the corporate veil.
Accordingly, Oswald suggests that the court “confused doctrine relating to
[shareholder] liability (piercing) with that relating to officer liability (personal
participation).” 910
However, the phrase from Orthokinetics should not be considered in
isolation, for the defendants at issue in the case were not solely officers.
Instead, the defendant officers “held all of [the company’s] directorships and
owned all of the stock in [the company].” 11 This means the defendants were
both corporate officers and shareholders. Consequently, to fully evaluate the
defendants’ personal liability, the court decided it needed to use both a piercing
the corporate veil analysis to determine the defendant’s liability as
shareholders, and a personal participation analysis to determine the defendant’s
liability as officers. 12
Later Federal Circuit cases followed the Orthokinetics decision when
dealing with defendants who were both shareholders and officers. For
example, ten years after Orthokinetics, in Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom
Metalcraft, Inc., the defendant was the “president, chief executive officer, and
principal shareholder of [the accused company],” making him both a
shareholder and an officer. 13 When analyzing the defendant’s personal
liability, the court first used a piercing of the corporate veil analysis to find that
the defendant’s company was not “a sham . . . merely to shield [the defendant]
from liability.” 14 Next, the court used a personal participation analysis,

8

Oswald, supra note 3 at 576 (citing Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579).
Id.
10 Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (b), a person can be held personally liable for direct infringement and
inducement of infringement. This law opened the door to personal liability for corporate officers without
needing to pierce the corporate veil. Lynda J. Oswald, The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent
Infringement, 44 IDEA 115, 122 (2003)
11 Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1579 (emphasis added).
12 The court had two separate sections in its opinion, one labeled “Personal Liability for Infringement,”
where it discussed alter ego-esque concepts like control, and a second section labeled “Willful Infringement of
the ‘867 Patent,” where it separately analyzed liability from a personal participation perspective. Id. at 1578–
79.
13 Hoover Grp., Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1996). It is worth noting
that Oswald called Hoover the Federal Circuit’s attempt “to correct its wrong decision on officer liability.”
Oswald, supra note 3 at 578.
14 Hoover, 84 F.3d at 1411.
9
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explaining that the corporate veil does not need to be pierced to find someone
personally liable for inducing infringement. 15 Oswald came closest to a correct
perspective on the Federal Circuit’s approach when she observed that, “the
[Hoover court] found that individual officer liability for direct infringement
under section 271(a) could be based on either a piercing of the corporate veil
or personal participation.” 16 However, she then stated that this approach only
gets “one-half of the analysis correct,” a conclusion she could only have
reached if she did not recognize the defendant was a shareholder as well as an
officer. 17
It is true that the Federal Circuit could be clearer in articulating when it is
using a particular analysis in these cases. The Federal Circuit tends to lump
both analyses into one section of its opinion. 18 However, it is inaccurate to say
the Federal Circuit is unaware of the separate analyses.
In fact, proponents of the idea that the Federal Circuit created a new
standard fail to cite a single case supporting the conclusion that someone who
is a company officer, but not a shareholder, can be held personally liable for
patent infringement by piercing the corporate veil. Given that the application
of the alter ego doctrine is a common way to pierce the corporate veil 19 and
non-shareholders are unlikely to be held as alter egos of a company, this lack
of support is to be expected. Indeed, this outcome is evidenced by Federal
Circuit personal liability patent infringement cases where the defendants were
only officers and not shareholders. For example, in Manville Sales Corp. v.
Paramount Systems Inc. and Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., cases where the
defendants were only officers, the Federal Circuit court did not find the
defendant officers personally liable under the pierced veil analysis, reasoning
that they were not the companies’ alter egos. 20 In Manville, the Federal Circuit
said the district court committed an “abuse of its equitable powers” when it
found two corporate officers personally liable despite finding the officers were

15

Id.
Oswald, supra note 3 at 577.
17 Id.
18 See e.g. Hoover, F.3d at 1411. (devoting one section to the analyses, entitled “LIABILITY,” which
does not include any subsections or identifying divisions).
19 SPERO: ASSET PROTECTION ¶ 11.03 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, (2001), Westlaw 1585220.
20 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[t]he court’s
findings preclude any inference that Butterworth and DiSimone were attempting to avoid liability under the
protection of the corporate veil”); Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(refusing to pierce the corporate veil because the defendant did not show the requisite control over the
company).
16
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not the alter egos of their company. 21 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed
the finding. 22 Likewise, in Hall, the Federal Circuit did not find the Defendant,
who was the Vice President and General Merchandise Manager, but not a
shareholder, of a company, personally liable for that company’s patent
infringement. 23 The Federal Circuit did not give much explanation for its
decision, and instead simply proclaimed that there was no “reversible error in
the district court’s dismissal” of the personal liability claim when “applying the
principles of New York law.” 24 However, an examination of the relevant New
York law makes the Federal Circuit’s decision more clear. New York law
states, “to pierce the corporate veil . . . [one must show] that the owner
exercised complete domination over the corporation . . . and . . . that such
domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong.” 25 Since the Defendant in
Hall was not a shareholder or owner of the infringing company, he could not
have been found personally through piercing the corporate veil. 26
It is possible that the Federal Circuit is confused when it comes to piercing
the corporate veil. Although the active inducement test is not traditionally part
of veil piercing, the federal circuit seems to believe that every time an
employee of a corporation is held personally liable, it is considered piercing
the corporate veil. 27 However, to think that this slight deviation actually creates
a new standard for personal liability is to go overboard with a presumption.
Fear not litigants, everything in patent personal liability is as it should be in the
Federal Circuit. Though, if an officer or shareholder is still confused about
when they might be liable for patent infringement, I suggest they try not to
commit the infringement in the first place.
ZACHARY FIALKOW ∗

21

Id. at 553.
Id.
23 Hall, 705 F.3d at 1364–65.
24 Id. at 1365.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See Id.; accord Manville, 917 F.2d at 553.
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